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THE LAND-TENURE SYSTEM IN IRELAND:
A FATAL REGIME
I. INTRODUCTION
The Great Famine ravaged Ireland from 1845 to 1849.1 The Irish Fam-
ine has been viewed as a "cataclysmic turning point in Irish demographic
and economic history."2 It is estimated that anywhere from one-half mil-
lion to three million people perished.3 As a result of the mass starvation
within Ireland, there was a great exodus during the Famine years. Over a
million Irish crossed the Atlantic to North America, and even greater num-
bers emigrated across the English Channel to Liverpool, Glasgow, and
South Wales.4
It is generally accepted that the Irish Famine was caused by a series of
potato crop failures brought about by a fungal disease called phythophthora
infestans.5 The fungus destroyed the potato crops that a majority of the
Irish depended upon as their sole means of subsistence.6 A number of theo-
ries have been offered to explain Ireland's vulnerability to the blight. The
theory of overpopulation has received the most attention. The reliance on
the potato and the starvation that accompanied the blight was seen as the
"price paid by the reckless Irish for their high nuptiality and their large
families." 7 The Great Famine has frequently been analyzed as a case study
in Malthusian population theory.8 Another theory that has received signifi-
cantly less attention attributes the devastation of the blight to the structure
of the land system in Ireland. "All this wretchedness and misery could,
1. ROBERT KEE, IRELAND: A HISTORY 11 (1982).
2. Kevin O'Rourke, Did the Great Irish Famine Matter?, 51 J. ECON. HIST. 1, 1 (1991).
3. CORMAC O'GRADA, THE GREAT IRISH FAMINE 48 (1989) [hereinafter O'GRADA (1989)].
It should be noted that this calculation does not include the deaths of the emigrants who fled
during the Famine. See Phelim P. Boyle & Cormac O'Grada, Fertility Trends, Excess Mortality,
and the Great Irish Famine, 23 DEMOGRAPHY 543, 555 (1986).
4. CECIL WOODHAM-SMITH, THE GREAT HUNGER: IRELAND 1845-1849, at 206 (1962).
5. Peter Solar, The Great Famine Was No Ordinary Subsistence Crisis, in FAMINE: THE IRISH
EXPERIENCE 112, 112 (E. Margaret Crawford ed., 1989).
6. In 1845, there was a partial failure of the potato crop, and in 1846, 1848, and 1849, there
were total failures. Id. At the initial sign of blight and crop failure, three million out of 8.5
million Irish relied on the potato almost exclusively for food, and millions more consumed im-
mense quantities. Boyle & O'Grada, supra note 3, at 543.
7. O'GRADA (1989), supra note 3, at 9.
8. According to Malthus, famine is the last corrective measure to overpopulation: "Famine
seems to be the last, the most dreadful resource of nature. The power of population is so superior
to the power of the earth to produce subsistence for man, that premature death must in some
shape or other visit the human race." THOMAS R. MALTHUS, AN ESSAY ON THE PRINCIPLE OF
POPULATION 118-19 (Augustus M. Kelly pub., Sentry Press 1971) (7th ed. 1872).
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almost without exception, be traced to a single source-the system under
which land had come to be occupied and owned in Ireland, a system pro-
duced by centuries of successive conquests, rebellions, confiscations, and
punitive legislation."9 The limited work on this theory has focused on the
problems of inefficient investment in the land.'
This Comment will consider a second and ultimately fatal problem re-
lated to the land-tenure system. In addition to contributing to inefficient
investment, the ownership of land by absentee landlords and the distribu-
tion of land through tenancies at will allowed landlords to charge excessive
rents, commonly called "rent-seeking." The inefficient investment in the
land, coupled with rent-seeking, forced tenants to allocate the best land to
crops that could be sold to pay the excessive rent. This allocation led to
reliance on the potato as the sole means of subsistence because the tenants
could only use small plots of poor land for their subsistence crop. Reliance
on a single subsistence crop proved fatal when blight devastated the potato
crop in the 1840s. Section II will describe pre-Famine Irish society and the
system of land ownership. Section III will analyze the causes of inefficient
investment in pre-Famine agriculture and test the hypothesis that inefficient
investment alone led to the devastation of the Great Famine. The final sec-
tion presents the theory that both rent-seeking and inefficient investment in
the land made Ireland vulnerable to the impact of the potato blight.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF PRE-FAMINE IRELAND
A. Irish Society and Its People
Pre-Famine Ireland had two distinguishing characteristics, both of
which made the land-tenure system central to the well-being of the Irish
people. The first was Ireland's reliance on agriculture. "Ireland has al-
ways been and seems destined to remain a land of agriculture."I" Before
the Great Famine, Ireland was not highly industrialized primarily because
of its location and the lack of natural resources necessary for industrial de-
velopment. 2 Any semblance of industry that existed in 1845 was near col-
9. WOODHAM-SMITH, supra note 4, at 20.
10. See Joel M. Guttman, The Economics of Tenant Rights in Nineteenth Century Irish Agri-
culture, 18 ECON. INQUIRY 408 (1980); Cormac O'Grada, Agricultural Head Rents, Pre-Famine
and Post-Famine, 5 ECON. & Soc. REV. 385 (1971) [hereinafter O'Grada (1971)]; Barbara L.
Solow, A New Look at the Irish Land Question, 12 ECON. & Soc. REV. 301 (1981).
11. JOHN E. POMFRET, THE STRUGGLE FOR LAND IN IRELAND: 1800-1923, at 1 (1930).
12. Id.
In addition to lacking the necessary deposits of coal and iron, Ireland's location on the
periphery of Europe has isolated her in times past from the Continent. Geographically,
England blocked the way. From the sixteenth century on England and Englishmen, chal-
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lapse.Ia Additionally, the percentage of the labor force in industry was
declining prior to the Famine.14 In 1821, 42.9% of Irish laborers were in
industry; by 1841, this number had declined to 28.4%. 11 Because of the
lack of industrial job opportunities before the Famine, the vast majority of
the Irish population depended upon the land for their livelihood. As one
author noted, the "possession of a piece of land was literally the difference
between life and death."'16
Rapid population growth was the second distinguishing characteristic of
pre-Famine Ireland. It is widely accepted that the population in Ireland
was increasing rapidly between 1760 and 1845.17 Between 1791 and 1841 it
is estimated that the population increased from 4,753,000 to 8,175,000.18
Despite almost uniform agreement that pre-Famine Ireland experienced a
population explosion, there is no agreement as to the source of this growth.
Factors frequently cited include early marriage, high birth rates, and the
role of the family in Irish culture.' 9 Whatever the source, the conclusion
remains that Ireland was a densely populated country that relied exclu-
sively on its land for support. Therefore, land ownership was particularly
significant to the well-being of the country and its people.
B. The Ownership of Land in Pre-Famine Ireland
Throughout the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the organization of the
agricultural community in Ireland resembled feudalism. The head of the
lenged by the exigencies of an awakening Europe, embarked upon a course which led in
time to the industrial revolution. But for Ireland, in the shadow of England, there was
little share in the immense volume of trade; no need to revamp her economic system to suit
its demands; and in consequence there was no awakening.
Id. at 1-2.
13. WOODHAM-SMITH, supra note 4, at 31. For example, production in the woolen industry
was down 50% in 1845. Id. at 31-32.
14. Id at 32.
15. CORMAC O'GRADA, IRELAND BEFORE AND AFTER THE FAMINE: EXPLORATIONS IN
ECONOMIC HISTORY, 1800-1925, at 25-28, 36 (1988) [hereinafter O'GRADA (1988)].
16. WOODHAM-SMITH, supra note 4, at 32.
17. See V. Morgan & W. Macafee, Irish Population in the Pre-Famine Period: Evidence from
County Antrim, 37 EcON. HisT. REV. 182, 182 (1981); see also O'Rourke, supra note 2, at 1-2.
But see JOEL MOKYR, WHY IRELAND STARVED: A QUANTITATIVE AND ANALYTICAL HISTORY
OF THE IRISH ECONOMY, 1800-1850, at 30-80 (1983).
18. O'Rourke, supra note 2, at 2. Another scholar estimates that the population increased
172% from 1779 to 1841. G. TALBOT GRIFFITH, POPULATION PROBLEMS IN THE AGE OF
MALTHUS 50 (1926), quoted in WOODHAM-SMITH, supra note 4, at 29.
19. See Patrick McGregor, Demographic Pressure and the Irish Famine: Malthus After
Mokyr, 65 LAND ECON. 228 (1989); G.S.L Tucker, Irish Fertility Ratios Before the Famine, 23
ECON. HIST. REV. 267 (1970); WOODHAM-SMITH, supra note 4, at 30-3 1. See generally Boyle &
O'Grada, supra note 3; Morgan & Macafee, supra note 17.
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feudal society was the Monarch, who, despite his lack of sovereign power,
was the acknowledged superior of the lesser kings.2" The lesser kings, or
lords, held the land of the country. The land of Celtic Ireland was con-
trolled by four or five lords who each possessed large tracts of land.21 The
lords kept a parcel for themselves and divided the remainder of the tract
into smaller plots that were distributed to the lower serfs (chiefs and septs)
in the form of "landed usages."22 The terms of the usages required the
septs and chiefs to provide services to the lords and to pay dues. 23 To main-
tain possession of their plots, the serfs had to assist the lords in the cultiva-
tion of their land, deliver a share of the produce from their own land to the
lords, and give their services to the lords in times of war.24 The obligation
to fight for the lord was central because the lords were constantly feuding.
"Ireland was a land of incessant strife and war .... [T]he Irish Celts were
in a state of perpetual tribal discord. ''25
During the reign of Henry VIII (1509-47), England sought to end the
incessant chaos in Ireland and dispel any risks of rebellion. "Henry laid
down an all-important change on paper: all lands in Ireland, whether
owned by the Gaelic Irish or Gaelicized English, were to be surrendered to
the Crown and then re-granted, thus asserting unquestionably the Crown's
claim to ultimate control over them."'26 Ireland refused to surrender its
land. However, with the accession of James I in 1603, the system of land
ownership in Ireland changed dramatically.27 The Celtic feudal system was
decimated by a series of confiscations that shifted the ownership of Irish
land from the Celtic peasants and their chieftains to the English. 28 "There
was one purpose and policy in all the 'confiscations,' 'settlements,' 'planta-
tions,' and 'forfeitures' carried out by the English invaders, and that was to
seize and own the land of Ireland. '12 9
During the seventeenth century, England confiscated in excess of three
million acres of land.30 These confiscations laid the groundwork for the
land-tenure and middleman systems that dominated the eighteenth and
20. WILLIAM 0. MORRIS, IRELAND 1494-1868, at 8 (Cambridge, The University Press 1896).
21. Id.
22. Id at 10-11.
23. Id. at 10; see also Richard Grabowski, Economic Development and Feudalism, 25 J. DE-
VELOPING AREAS 179, 180 (1991).
24. Grabowski, supra note 23, at 180.
25. MORRIS, supra note 20, at 4.
26. KEE, supra note 1, at 30.
27. MORRIS, supra note 20, at 123-29.
28. Id.
29. MICHAEL DAVITT, THE FALL OF FEUDALISM IN IRELAND 10 (1904).
30. MORRIS, supra note 20, at 126.
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nineteenth centuries. Under the middleman system, the large tracts of land
that had been acquired by the English were let at a fixed rate to a single
Englishman who resided in Ireland and was known as the middleman.3
The middleman then sublet the property to Irish peasants.32 "This 'middle-
man system' produced misery: the landlord rid himself of responsibility
and assured himself of a regular income, but the tenants were handed over
to exploitation." 33
Under the land-tenure system, absentee landlords rented small tracts of
land to Irish peasants without the assistance of a middleman. Irish peasants
could also obtain plots of land through two additional methods known as
rundale and conacre. Land held in rundale was rented in common and
subsequently divided among a number of tenants, who received a small va-
riety of plots of different qualities of soil.34 Conacre was a method of "hir-
ing" a very small plot of land to grow one crop.35 All of these arrangements
proved to be disastrous for Irish tenants. "The land system thus introduced
was a method of government, a badge of conquest, and a means of holding
in subjection of the common people."36
Irish tenants and English landlords viewed each other with animosity.
"Ireland was a conquered country, the Irish peasant a dispossessed man,
[and] his landlord an alien conqueror."37 In addition to being dispossessed
of their property, Irish tenants were denied the legal protection once en-
joyed under ancient Irish customs and land laws. English land laws were
imported into Ireland, and these laws "pushed to their extreme the rights of
landlords, and conceded nothing to the occupiers, in respect of their cus-
tomary rights under the old Irish customs."38 Tenants generally were not
given leases. 39 Instead, they became tenants at will who could be evicted at
anytime and for any reason.' Additionally, tenants received no compensa-
tion for improvements made on the land during their tenancy and received
no protection from rent increases or eviction.4
31. VOODHAM-SMITH, supra note 4, at 22.
32. Id.
33. Id
34. See POMFRET, supra note 11, at 18; WOODHAM-SMITH, supra note 4, at 33.
35. G. SHAW LEFEVRE, AGRARIAN TENURES 101-02 (London, Cassell & Co. 1893).
36. Id at 92.
37. WOODHAM-SMrrH, supra note 4, at 21.
38. LEFEVRE, supra note 35, at 92.
39. "[L]eases were the exception not the rule.... In many cases the landlord refused a lease
because he had the tenant more completely under his control; in others, the tenant declined be-
cause... legislation had so greatly increased the cost of the stamp on a lease that he could not find
the necessary [money]." WOODHAM-SMITH, supra note 4, at 23.
40. Id at 22.
41. LEFEVRE, supra note 35, at 93-95.
1993]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
This lack of protection placed the Irish tenants in a vulnerable position.
The tenants were even more vulnerable due to the dramatic increase in pop-
ulation prior to the Great Famine. 42 The growth in population increased
the demand for land, which provided an incentive for landlords to evict
tenants and find new tenants who were willing to pay a higher price for the
land. To capture the highest rent, landlords advertised for proposals and
rented their property to the highest bidder.43 Thus, Ireland's lack of indus-
trialization and growing population forced the Irish tenants to accept these
harsh terms of tenancy and adapt to this system of land ownership, despite
the injustices and inefficiencies produced by that system.
III. INEFFICIENT INVESTMENT AND THE LAND SYSTEMS OF IRELAND
Historians and economists have explored ways in which feudalism and
the land-tenure system, described in the previous section, have affected the
willingness of landlords and tenants to invest in improvements. 4 All agree
that "[i]t would be difficult to conceive a system more opposed to the pros-
perity and progress of an agricultural community."' 45 It has been argued
that the land systems of Ireland created impediments to improvement of the
land and that this failure led to insufficient capital formation in agriculture,
making Ireland susceptible to poverty and the Great Famine.46 This sec-
tion will analyze how feudalism and land tenure precluded efficient invest-
ment in the land and will test the hypothesis that inefficient agricultural
investment alone made Ireland vulnerable to the potato blight.
A. Feudalism and Inefficient Investment in the Land
Irish agriculture was laden with problems prior to England's unwel-
come arrival and the imposition of the land-tenure system. The Celtic feu-
dal system, in effect until the seventeenth century, was inefficient because it
discouraged the use of available economic resources to increase agricultural
output. The productivity-enhancing investments that could have been en-
couraged included removing stones, adding fertilizers, leveling fields, im-
proving irrigation, and increasing the use of fodder crops.47 However, the
42. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
43. WOODHAM-SMITH, supra note 4, at 33.
44. See, e.g., MOKYR, supra note 17; O'GRADA (1988), supra note 15; Grabowski, supra note
23; Anthony Leddin, Inefficiency in Irish Agriculture, 11 ECON. & Soc. REV. 127 (1980); O'Grada
(1971), supra note 10.
45. LEFEVRE, supra note 35, at 95.
46. MOKYR, supra note 17, at 81-82.
47. Grabowski, supra note 23, at 183-84. See generally Gregory Clark, The Cost of Capital
and Medieval Agricultural Technique, 25 EXPLORATIONS ECON. HIsT. 265 (1988).
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nature of feudal society and the institutional arrangements between lord
and serf in the feudal system restricted the creation and diffusion of these
available and more efficient techniques.4 8
Constant fighting among the lords was common in feudal society.49 As
a result of this turmoil, the lords had little incentive or opportunity to invest
in the land.50 If the lord improved his land, it would become attractive to
others and increase the likelihood that his land would be a target for attack
and conquest. The lord also failed to invest in improvements because such
investments were time consuming. Time spent improving the land inter-
fered with fighting and defending the land. As a result, the lord who im-
proved his land had weaker military forces and was more vulnerable to
attack.51
The lord's distrust of the serfs created an additional disincentive to land
improvement. Although improvements would have increased the output on
the land, thereby increasing the share the lord could demand from the serf,
the lord had no incentive to invest in these improvements because he had no
guarantee of capturing any of the benefits. The lord had no assurance that
the serf would not undervalue his output in order to reduce the dues he
owed the lord. 2 Therefore, the lord's fear that the serf might lie about the
gain from the improvements was an additional factor that led to an ineffi-
cient investment in the land.
The duties that the serf owed to the lord under the terms of their us-
ages 3 created barriers to the serf's investment in improvements of the land.
To maintain possession of his land, the serf was forced to work the land of
his lord and to provide military services in times of war.54 This left little
time for the serf to work or improve his own land. The requirement that
the serf deliver a portion of his output to the lord also discouraged invest-
ment because the serf had no assurance that his lord would not demand
delivery of the entire increase in output. 55 As a result, the serf would not
receive any return on his investment, while the lord would capture the en-
tire benefit of the serf's improvements. Thus, the terms of the landed us-
ages, which required the serf to pay dues and provide services, prevented
efficient investment in the land.
48. Grabowski, supra note 23, at 179.
49. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
50. Grabowski, supra note 23, at 187.
51. See id. at 184-85.
52. Id. at 188-89.
53. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
54. Grabowski, supra note 23, at 188-89.
55. Id. at 184-85.
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The inefficiencies inherent to the Celtic feudal system placed Irish agri-
culture, the lifeblood of the country, in a dangerous position as the seven-
teenth century approached. If the inefficiencies were not remedied, Ireland
and its people would suffer tremendously from very low standards of living
due to decreased agricultural productivity. Unfortunately, no remedy was
forthcoming, and the problems with Ireland's land system only escalated
with the imposition of the land-tenure system.
B. Land Tenure and the Factors Contributing to Underinvestment
A number of components within Ireland's land-tenure system further
promoted inefficient investment in the land by tenants and landlords. The
absence of leases and the prevalence of tenants at will56 led to the tenants'
inefficient investment in the land. Without a lease, tenants constantly
feared eviction, and this fear discouraged all investment in the land. Ten-
ants had no incentive to invest because they had no assurances that they
would be permitted to remain on the property long enough to enjoy a return
on their investment. Any capital investments in the land, such as irrigation,
soil maintenance, or fertilization, stayed with the land, and tenants received
no compensation for these improvements when their tenancy was termi-
nated. 7 Without protection from eviction, tenants were unwilling to fi-
nance improvements on the land because the landlord, as owner of the land,
reaped all the benefits upon eviction. 8 Therefore, "the demise of long
leases involved a movement from an efficient to an inefficient situation, and
thwarted the process of capital accumulation necessary for the development
and modernization of Irish agriculture."59
The lack of any protection from random and substantial rent increases
was another characteristic of the land-tenure system that led to inefficient
investment in the land. When the landlord had the power to raise the rent
by the full amount of the value of the improvements, underinvestment
would occur.6 0 This behavior was possible and prevalent because once the
tenant invested in the land, the improvement could not be removed.
Irish tenants would have had an incentive to improve their land if they
could have entered into contracts with landlords that would have compen-
sated tenants for improvements made, provided some security of tenure, or
56. Approximately 80% of Irish tenants were tenants at will. Guttman, supra note 10, at
413.
57. WOODHAM-SMITH, supra note 4, at 22.
58. MOKYR, supra note 17, at 82.
59. Id. at 83.
60. Id. at 86. When the landlord engaged in this type of behavior he was said to be engaging
in "predatory behavior." Id.
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protected tenants from rent increases. However, the high transaction costs
of the land-tenure system due to absentee landlords provided a disincentive
for landlords and tenants to enter into such agreements.
On the one hand, tenants were deterred by the costs of making and
enforcing agreements with landlords that the latter would provide
compensation for improvements should the tenant leave the farm.
On the other hand, landlords were deterred by the costs of monitor-
ing tenants so that the latter did not misuse improvements financed
by landlords. 1
Furthermore, landlords had no desire to enter into any contracts with ten-
ants because such agreements would constrain the landlords' power to evict
or raise rent. Because the landlords' goal was to extract as much money
from the land as possible, any contractual agreement with tenants would
have been an obstacle to this rent-seeking.
In addition to rent-seeking, there were a number of reasons why English
landlords neglected to invest in their holdings in Ireland. "The small size of
holdings, the uncertain political situation, general economic conditions, the
availability of more lucrative investment alternatives-all of these factors
may have contributed to the landlords' reluctance to improve."62 Land-
lords were further deterred from investing because they were already mak-
ing a substantial profit on the rent collected on the unimproved land.
Finally, landlords neglected to make improvements because they feared
that tenants would use the investment so intensively that the value of the
improvement would depreciate at too high a rate.63 Misuse of an improve-
ment was likely to occur when ienants had no security of tenure. However,
if tenants had been given some security, misuse would not have been a prob-
lem because tenants would have "in the process of maximizing [their] net
income, use[d] the improvement optimally."'
It is clear that the various land systems operating in Ireland prior to the
Great Famine failed to create incentives for landlords or tenants to invest in
agricultural improvements. As a result, the land was used inefficiently, and
agriculture production in Ireland did not achieve an efficient, maximum
output. The backwardness of pre-Famine agriculture caused by the ineffi-
cient investment becomes apparent when Ireland's labor productivity in
61. Guttman, supra note 10, at 413.
62. O'Grada (1971), supra note 10, at 390.
63. Guttman, supra note 10, at 412.
64. Id at 412-13.
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1845 is compared to England's labor productivity.65 British superiority in
labor productivity at that time was more than two to one.66
Even though Irish agriculture was backward and inefficient, the yields
from Irish grain crops were steadily improving, and exportation of grain
overseas was increasing throughout the nineteenth century.67 The informa-
tion suggests that, despite inefficient agricultural productivity, plenty of
food was being produced in Ireland when the potato blight occurred. It is
clear, then, that inefficient investment was not the sole cause, and perhaps
not even a major cause, leading to the starvation of millions of Irish when
the Great Famine ravaged the country. Therefore, previous explanations
that attribute the devastation of the potato blight to inefficient investment
are incomplete.
IV. IRELAND'S AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY AND PARADOXICAL
SUSCEPTIBILITY TO THE FAMINE
A complete analysis of the devastation caused by the potato blight must
consider why, despite relatively strong yields of other crops, Irish tenants
were vulnerable to blight of a single crop. The following section will ex-
plore in more detail the agricultural productivity of Ireland during the fam-
ine years and suggest reasons that better explain Ireland's vulnerability to
the potato blight.
A. Agricultural Productivity: 1800-49
Export statistics support the conclusion that despite inefficient invest-
ment in the land, Ireland's agricultural output was increasing steadily. Ta-
ble I depicts the increasing productivity and exportation of Irish grain crops
during the nineteenth century.








66. O'GRADA (1988), supra note 15, at 52.
67. Id. at 52-53; see also O'GRADA (1989), supra note 3, at 29-30.
68. O'GRADA (1988), supra note 15, at 57.
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On the eve of the Great Famine, one quarter of all grain crops, including
two-fifths of the oat crop, were being exported.6 9 Other statistics support
the conclusion that three-fifths of Ireland's total agricultural output was
marketed abroad prior to the Famine.7" In order to export such quantities,
the tenants' agricultural productivity must have been increasing despite the
failure of tenants and landlords to invest in improvements on the land.
Even when blight ravaged the potato crop in Ireland, the production
and exportation of grain continued.7 It was estimated that during the
1840s, Ireland was producing enough grain to feed eighteen million people.
However, little of this food stayed within the country; "a ship sailing into
an Irish port during the famine years with a cargo of grain was 'sure to
meet six ships sailing out with a similar cargo.' ,72 The paradox of Ire-
land's situation was that, despite the abundant quantities of food produced
during the potato blight, millions were starving. Irish peasants were forced
to endure the horrible sight of convoys, loaded with precious food, leaving
Ireland and its starving masses.73
B. The Land-Tenure System and the Exploitation of Irish Tenants
The sad irony and inhumanity of exporting food from a starving coun-
try forces one to ask why Irish tenants chose exportation over consumption
of the grain. Upon examination it becomes clear that Irish tenants exported
their grain because they had no other choice. Irish tenants, hopelessly ex-
ploited under the land-tenure system and the English land laws, were forced
to pay excessive rents for their small plots of land. To pay these rents,
tenants had to export immense quantities of the marketable grain they were
able to grow. This need to pay rent, coupled with the lack of any incentive
to improve the land, forced tenants to rely on potatoes as their sole means
of subsistence, making Irish tenants vulnerable to loss when this crop failed.
Therefore, it was the landlords and the land-tenure system that compelled
reliance on a single subsistence crop and forced Irish tenants to starve when
that crop failed.
The unscrupulous character of the English landlords is well docu-
mented in Irish history and literature.74 Profit was the only motive of the
69. Id. at 51.
70. Id.
71. During 1846, Ireland exported approximately 258,000 quarters of wheat, 701,000 hun-
dredweight of barley (worth approximately one million pounds), and 1,000,000 quarters of oats
and oatmeal. WOODHAM-SMITH, supra note 4, at 75.
72. Id at 75 (quoting John Mitchel, an Irish revolutionary).
73. Id. at 76-77.
74. See DAviTT, supra note 29, at 3-9.
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absentee landlords, 75 and the middlemen of the land-tenure system in Ire-
land were referred to as "land sharks," "bloodsuckers," and "the most op-
pressive species of tyrant that ever lent assistance to the destruction of a
country."'76 The land-tenure system in Ireland placed landlords in a power-
ful position, and tenants were at their mercy because the Irish depended
upon the land for survival. "The Irish landlord was highly favored in that
the whole rural population of the country was competing for the commod-
ity which he controlled; and he proceeded to take full advantage of the
situation. 7
7
Since profits were the landlords' only motive, they instituted a property
rights scheme that ensured maximization of their financial gains from their
holdings in Ireland. The English land laws provided tenants with no pro-
tection from substantial and arbitrary rent increases. Thus, landlords
raised rents at any time and in any amount. Additionally, the laws gave
landlords complete discretion to allocate the land among the Irish peasants.
To collect as many rents as possible from a parcel of land, the landlord
subdivided the land into a number of small plots. These small plots were
then allocated to the tenants, forcing them to make their living on very
small, yet very expensive, pieces of land.
In addition to the imposition of an advantageous land system and land
laws, the natural force of population growth within pre-Famine Ireland as-
sisted the landlords in the exploitation of the Irish tenants. As a result of
the unprecedented population growth in pre-Famine Ireland, the demand
for land increased dramatically. Increased demand drove up the price indi-
viduals were willing to pay for rent,78 which in turn provided a greater
incentive for the landlord to evict tenants and further subdivide his
holdings.
The landlords took advantage of this volatile market for land by contin-
ually subdividing their holdings and by letting property to the highest bid-
ders. Because of the desperate demand and necessity for land in pre-
Famine Ireland that resulted from the country's lack of industrialization,
tenants were willing to pay high prices for whatever minute parcel of land
they could acquire. Prior to the Great Famine, the 1841 Census reported
that landlords had subdivided their holdings to such an extent that forty-
75. The "successive owners of the soil of Ireland regarded it merely as a source from which to
extract as much money as possible." WOODHAM-SMITH, supra note 4, at 21.
76. Id. at 22 (endnote omitted).
77. POMFRET, supra note 11, at 19.
78. The total supply of land is fixed and thus, by definition, is perfectly inelastic. When a
good is perfectly inelastic, the demand for that good sets the price people are willing to pay. See
PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMics 666 (13th ed. 1989).
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five percent of the tenants' holdings consisted of fewer than five acres.79
Tenants were also forced to pay rents that were eighty to one hundred per-
cent higher than the rents in England for these small plots."0 These rent
prices often exceeded the actual value of the property.,' Tenants had no
choice but to pay these extorted rents because failure to pay resulted in
eviction that was "tantamount to a sentence of death by slow torture. '8 2
Landlords showed no mercy for tenants who were unable to pay rent8 3 be-
cause there were plenty of other tenants who were willing to let the land.
Survival meant paying rent at any cost.
In order to pay the high rents, tenants had to extract as much money as
possible from their small plots since the land was their only source of in-
come. To maximize the profit from the land, tenants allocated a majority of
the plot to marketable crops that could be exported, thus allowing them to
pay the rent. Unfortunately, once the rent was paid, tenants had little
money left to buy food. Not only did the land have to be profitable, but it
also had to provide food for the family. However, the high rents required
that most of the land be used to pay the rent, leaving less than one acre of
land to grow food for the traditionally large Irish family.
C. The Ramifications of the Rent-Seeking
The excessive rents charged by landlords forced tenants to export all
marketable grain crops and led to dependence on the potato as the sole
means of subsistence. The potato was the best and only choice for Ireland's
subsistence crop for several reasons. The potato was not a good cash crop:
"Potatoes had a low value to weight ratio and were thus not an attractive
crop to market given the high transport costs of the pre-Famine period."84
The potato was also the only viable option due to the small acreage avail-
able for the tenants' subsistence crop.
Irish tenants needed a crop that produced a high yield and provided a
sole means of subsistence. The potato is the only single food that can sup-
79. WOODHAM-SMITH, supra note 4, at 34. It should be noted that the calculation of this
census figure did not take into account holdings under one acre, which were probably extensive
prior to the Famine. Id. at 34-35.
80. Id. at 33.
81. In one study, the letting price was estimated to exceed the actual value of the land by
11.7%. O'Grada (1971), supra note 10, at 388.
82. WOODHAM-SMITH, supra note 4, at 32; see supra text accompanying notes 12-16.
83. WOODHAM-SMITH, supra note 4, at 271 ("Landlords were applying not for an eviction
order but for a judgment against the tenant who owed rent; he was put in prison and his wife and
children were left to fend for themselves.").
84. Patrick McGregor, The Impact of the Blight upon the Pre-Famine Rural Economy in
Ireland, 15 ECON. & Soc. REV. 289, 292 (1984).
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port life when fed as the sole article of diet."5 In addition to being nutri-
tional, the potato is also an inexpensive crop to grow. For example, the
potato produces the nutritional value of corn at one-third the cost.86 Addi-
tionally, large quantities of potatoes can be grown on small pieces of land.
"[A]n acre and a half would provide a family of five or six with food for
twelve months, while to grow the equivalent grain [would] require ... an
acreage four to six times as large....
One final attractive characteristic of the potato is that the production of
such an abundant yield does not require that the crop be planted in fertile,
improved land. Instead, the potato could be grown on mountain sides or on
wet, unimproved ground.88 The ability of Irish tenants to grow potatoes on
poor land was of utmost importance under the land-tenure system. As dis-
cussed earlier, the land-tenure system created disincentives for improve-
ment.89 Therefore, tenants did not improve any of the land and used the
naturally good land to grow cash crops that required good soil for maxi-
mum yield. Thus, tenants were left with the worst plots for subsistence
crops. Because the potato was one of the only crops that would thrive on
these poor lands, Irish tenants had no choice but to rely on the potato as
their sole subsistence crop.
Although the potato has a number of qualities that make it an excellent
subsistence crop, its susceptibility to disease makes sole reliance on the po-
tato dangerous.9" Prior to the Great Famine, the potato crop had failed
many times in Ireland.9" However, despite its likelihood for crop failure,
Irish peasants had no other choice. They either had to rely on the potato or
cut back on the amount of exports and face the possibility of eviction be-
cause the rent could not be paid.
Forced to rely on the risky potato crop because of the harsh terms of
tenancy imposed by the land-tenure system, Irish tenants were dealt a fatal
blow when this crop was decimated by the blight. The tenants' sole means
of subsistence was destroyed. They could not eat the grain they grew be-
cause they needed the profits to pay rent, and "[i]t would be a desperate
man who ate up his rent, with the certainty before him of eviction and
85. MOKYR, supra note 17, at 8.
86. O'GRADA (1989), supra note 3, at 11.
87. WOODHAM-SMITH, supra note 4, at 35.
88. Id.
89. See supra Section III of text.
90. WOODHAM-SMITH, supra note 4, at 38.
91. The failures, of varying degrees and in different locations within Ireland, occurred during
the following years: 1728, 1739, 1740, 1770, 1800, 1807, 1821, 1822, 1830-37, 1839, 1841, 1844,
and 1845. Id. at 38-53.
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'death by slow torture.' ,,92 Additionally, it has been suggested that the
Irish peasants did not rely on wheat because they did not know how to
convert grain into edible products. 93 Unfortunately, when the potato failed,
starvation occurred resulting in the death of millions.
The starvation of Irish peasants in the 1840s was no different in this
respect from any population, indeed any species, pressed into a marginal
niche and dependent upon a single source of food. Pandas that only eat the
leaves of a single variety of bamboo are vulnerable to loss when this bamboo
is destroyed. Kirtland warblers that only nest in one particular type of tree
are susceptible to extinction when this type of tree is destroyed. Similarly,
Irish tenants who relied only on the potato were vulnerable to starvation
when this crop failed. Irish peasants, however, were not pressed into their
niche by any evolutionary imperative or population explosion. They were
forced into dependence on a single crop by greed institutionalized in a legal
system that gave landlords tremendous power to demand ever increasing
rents.
V. CONCLUSION
The land-tenure system in Ireland proved to be fatal to the Irish because
it facilitated the exploitation of tenants. The land-tenure system en-
couraged inefficient investment and rent-seeking, leading to a reliance on
the potato as the sole means of subsistence. The failure of the potato was a
death sentence for the victims of the land-tenure system. Therefore ineffi-
cient investment and rent-seeking were the major causal mechanisms in the
Great Famine.
The devastation of the Great Famine could have been significantly re-
duced had the property regime provided tenants with more protection from
exploitation. Greater tenant protection would have required that the land-
tenure system be modified in ways that would have deterred rent-seeking by
landlords. The imposition of either rent controls or a land tax would have
prevented landlords from charging excessive rents, and these reduced rents
would have permitted Irish tenants to eat more of the crops they were pro-
ducing. A rent control would have denied landlords the opportunity to
raise rents and would have discouraged eviction of tenants because they
could not have collected higher rent from any other tenant. Therefore,
landlords would have been precluded from rent-seeking.
92. Id. at 76.
93. Charles Trevelyan, Head of Treasury (Ireland), wrote: "There is scarcely a woman of the
peasant class in the West of Ireland whose culinary art exceeds the boiling of a potato. Bread is
scarcely ever seen, and an oven is unknown." Id. (endnote omitted.)
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A progressive land tax may also have been successful in preventing rent-
seeking because it would have created a disincentive for landlords to raise
the rent.94 Under the progressive land tax scheme, a landlord would be
taxed heavily if he attempted to raise the rent to levels that forced tenants to
export the vast majority of their crops to pay these rents. Any benefit that
the landlord might have received from the higher rents would have been
negated by the tax, therefore creating a disincentive to raise rents beyond an
optimal level.
A more radical solution to the problems caused by the land-tenure sys-
tem would have involved dismantling the entire system and redistributing
property from the landlords to the Irish tenants. Removing landlords from
the land system would have solved the rent-seeking problem. However, re-
moval would have been difficult. Landlords were unwilling to sell the prop-
erty because they earned a greater profit from renting. By selling their
property, landlords could collect only a fixed return, whereas if they contin-
ued to let the property, the rent charged could be increased over time.
Thus, the only way redistribution would have occurred in Ireland was if the
English government intervened, seizing the land from the English landlords
and redistributing to the Irish tenants. This was highly unlikely because of
the political consequences. Giving the land back to the Irish meant surren-
dering control of the country, something the English were unwilling to do
at that time.
CYNTHIA E. SMITH*
94. Even though a land tax would have created a disincentive to raise rents, it would not have
also created a disincentive for the landlord to use the land efficiently. Henry George's Single-Tax
theory established that "[p]ure land rent is in the nature of a 'surplus' that can be taxed heavily
without distorting production incentives or impairing productive efficiency." SAMUELSON &
NORDHAUS, supra note 78, at 667. For a more detailed discussion of the Single-Tax theory, see
HENRY GEORGE, PROGRESS AND POVERTY (the Robert Schalkenbach Foundation 1987) (1879).
* I wish to thank Richard Trethewey, Professor of Economics, Kenyon College, and Alan
Madry, Assistant Professor, Marquette University Law School, for invaluable comments on ear-
lier drafts.
[Vol. 76:469
